



Do'i^uerto Rico and the Philippine Islands become integral parts 
of the United States under the Paris Treaty? ^ Oi ^y^ 



\ 



SPEECH 



HON. Afj. HOPKINS, 



OF ILLINOIS, 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 



TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1900. 



4083 



^WASHINGTON. 
1900. 

W\. //, ■?• 




Ml 



\ 



SPEECH 

OF 

HON. A. J. HOPKINS. 



The House being in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union, and having under consideration the bill (H. R. 8245) to regulate the 
trade of Puerto Rico, and for other purposes — 

Mr. HOPKINS said: 

Mr. Chairman: The bill under consideration provides — 

That on and after the passage of this act the same tariffs, customs, and duties 
shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles imported into Puerto 
Rico from ports other than tht)se of the United States which are required by 
law to be collected upon articles imported into the United States from for- 
eign countries. 

It does not provide for free trade between the islands and the 
United States, but fixes the rate of duty that shall be paid on all 
imports from Puerto Rico into the United States at 25 per cent of 
the duties charged on like articles from other foreign ports, and 
provides also that all articles imported into Puerto Rico from the 
United States shall only pay 25 per cent of the rate of duty im- 
posed there upon like articles from other foreign countries, with 
this ijroviso, that on all articles imported from Puerto Rico into 
the United States where internal -revenue duty is imposed in this 
country that the custom duty shall be 25 per cent of the duty im- 
posed on like articles from foreign countries plus the revenue tax 
levied and collected on the articles produced or manufactured in 
this country. It will thus be seen that under this bill the ques- 
tion is presented as to whether Puerto Rico and the Philippine 
Islands, under the treaty of peace entered into between this Grov- 
ernmentand Spain, become integral parts of the United States or 
whether they can be treated as territory, and separate and dis- 
tinct custom laws and internal-revenue laws imposed there from 
what are levied, collected, and paid in the United States. The 
issue presented in this bill, as thus briefly stated, is of paramount 
importance to the people of this country. 

The treaty of peace negotiated between the United States and 
Spain was a great triumph of American diplomacy and American 
statesmanship. It fixed the terms of settlement at the conclusion 
of a war the most brilliant of any in the history of our country. 
There is a destiny that shapes the affairs of nations as well as of 
men. The American Republic in all of its splendid career has 
had the favoring countenance of an allwise and just Q-od. Never 
in its history, however, has the interposition of Divine Providence 
been more manifest than in our relations with Spain in the late 
war. 

1 have neither the time nor the inclination to review in any de- 
tail the circumstances which led to the declaration of war against 
Spain. This is all familiar history, known to every member on 
the floor, and a subject with which the great mass of our fellow 
2 ''. - ^^83 



Conf 






people, almost with the voice of one man demanded of 'th«r-^® 
ernmentof the United States not oSy a (SSatfon of w i?"": 

m all of his wonderful career on the sea/neve? achieved so brS ant 
a victory as the. one gained by Dewey over the Spanish fleet ?n 
Manila Harbor That great naval battle not onlyp^S Dewev's 
^n^.Mf'n ^*^^'°'^°''^^^«' b"t it fixed duties and?e8pon8iStfe8 
?eSin ' ?h JftZ w* °V^%Unrted States so momentous so fS- 
reacnmg that the wisest and ablest in our midst are unahlA fn 
agree as to their proper solution. Four probtems faced onrrnr^ 
S'lSaL'^ilh^Thi SnSr'^^" ^" Paris\o ne?otShTtrTaTy 
shoKera'de* of !S!^&ii7,T^'S^S' '^ *° -^^* ^-P-^ioS 
First, our Army and Navy could be withdrawn from the islands 
and Spain again be given the power and authority Se was exer 
SS«^* f ^t^^^-^d^^r^ip^weysfleetfirst sailedLtoPMI pp?ne 
themselves. Third, the islands could be taken and divided amon^ 
fw^^lf. f^''^"!?- F.^"^*^' ^^^ islands could be held by the 
t^?a vofnl'L^'^Th"*^^ terms and stipulations expressed in the 
treaty of peace. The reasons that were urged by the people of this 

potent against our commissioners allowing Spain to reassert her 
sovereigntyover the Philippine Islands. OurXty to humanity t J 
?hft«trr,^'rr°'V^^^^^' people of those islands'^ demanded tha? 
S^S^ ^-""."^ this Government should be maintained there to 
fJhl^ fniiT'fi?^ anarchy, bloodshed, and riot that would ineW- 
tably follow the turning of them over to the people themselves 
under present conditions. No self-respecting AmSan n^TovIr 

fn^n'rrfZ'^i'^V^'^i'l^.'^r ^^^^^^ ^'^^^^^'^ «^ l^"'^ ^nd sea, couldfor 
biHt?S hl-n °.^ ""^ f^^ great archipelago, with its future possi- 
5 fhf -p ^ *"''''!? °''^'' ^° *^® grasping ambition and avarice 
S;el tpr n^^?''^? V^*'^?^' T-^^ ^""^ ^''■•^^y attempting to absorb the 
greater part of the Asiatic and oriental trade from America. 
There was but one thmg left for the American commissioners to 
United States^^^ provide for the cession of those islands to the 

The consensus of opinion in this country to-day, Mr. Chairman 
approves the wise action of these able and distinguished commis- 
sioners, ihe people of this country unite in their approval of the 
President s course m all our relations with Spain; and history I 
am sure will vindicate also the wisdom of his course. When wkr 
was declared no one dreamed that the far-off Orient would wit- 
ness the first scenes of hostilities between the two nations. Our 
tnoughts, our expectations, and our hopes were all centered In the 
neet that was to blockade Cuban ports, and in the army that was 
to invade Cuban soil. 

The god of war ordained it otherwise, and placed under our 
naval and mihtary control the islands which are to-day inhabitec 
4ma 



by millions of people representing various stages of political de- 
velopment, from sayagery to civilization. I approve with my 
whole heart the cession of these islands to the United States, and 
I do not join with those who indulge in dark forebodings of the 
future because of the problems which have arisen on account of 
their acquisition. 

I believe that the American Republic is destined to grow in all 
the elements that make a great nation more rapidly in the future 
than in the past and that its influence will be marked and potent 
among all the nations of the earth. I believe that these great 
results can be brought about without endangering our domestic 
institutions or without impairing those great principles of liberty 
and free government that are the heritage of every American citi- 
zen. I thank God that I was born an optimist instead of a pessi- 
mist; that I can see something good in men rather than evil; 
that political organizations are formed for the betterment of the 
people of our country rather than for corrupt purposes and the 
spoils of office, and that in our Government we can go on increas- 
ing our trade, our commerce, our population and wealth, and in 
all the elements that go to make up a great sovereignty, without 
impairing any of those conditions so sacred to the fathers of the 
Republic and so important a factor in the perpetuation of repub- 
lican institutions. 

I believe that the Constitution of the United States is broad 
enough and elastic enough to enable us to control the inhabitants 
of those islands and give them a larger liberty and a higher civil- 
ization than they have heretofore enjoyed without impairing in 
the least the integrity of our domestic institutions or entailing 
upon our people any additional taxation. I recognize the fact 
that it would be inopportune to engage in a long and elaborate 
argument to show what the powers are of our Government and 
the manner in which they should or can be exercised. I take it, 
Mr. Chairman, that these questions have been sufficiently dis- 
cussed to satisfy every fair-minded man that the United States 
Government has the constitutional power to acquire these islands. 
If there is ^ny doubting Thomas among us at this late day I 
would call his attention to the remarks of Chief Justice Marshall 
in the case of American Insurance Company vs. Canter (1 Peters, 
542), in which case, speaking for the court, he said: 

The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union the 
powers of making war and of making treaties: consequently, that Govern- 
ment possesses the powers of acquiring territory, either by conquest or 
treaty. * * * If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, 
and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed, 
either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession or on such as its new 
master may impose. 

There are many other decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States which confirm the doctrine here announced. This 
is practically only asserting the sovereign power of the United 
States. When England recognized our independence, and we 
took a place among the sovereign nations of , the earth, we took it 
with all the power and authority that can be exercised by any 
other independent sovereignty in all this world. The power of 
acquiring and of disposing of territory is an incident of sovereignty 
itself. 

It could be exercised by the United States Government if there 
were nothing in the Constitution relating to the subject, but, as 
this great and eminent Chief Justice said, under the Constitution 
i083 



which unites the separate States into one grand Republic the 
article which provides for the declaration of war and the making 
of treaties carries with it the power to either acquire or dispose 
of territory at the sovereign will of the United States Govern- 
ment. Therefore the President, in authorizing his commissioners 
to enter into the articles of the treaty of peace between this Gov- 
ernment and Spain, to acquire by cession from the Spanish Gov- 
ernment Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands, was simply 
exercising the sovereign rights inherent in our Government. 

No man conversant with international law and familiar with 
the Constitution of the United States will contend for a moment 
that the acquisition of those islands was unconstitutional or be- 
yond the power of the Government. As to what our relations to 
those islands shall be under the treaty of peace is, however, quite 
a different question. I have been greatly interested in the discus- 
sion which has been carried on in this House and in the Senate on 
this subject. Men whom I believe are honest in their convictions 
diifer widely; some contend that by the very acquisition of those 
islands they become an integral part of the United States and that 
the inhabitants, varying as they do from savagery to semiciviliza- 
tion and perhaps to civilization, are guaranteed under our Con- 
stitution all the rights, privileges, and immunities that form the 
sacred inheritance of every American citizen. I have given very 
careful and anxious thought to that subject, and, speaking only for 
myself, I am entirely clear as to the status that will be held by the 
people of those islands and the relations that the islands themselves 
will bear to the Government of the United States under the Con- 
stitution. 

You will note, Mr. Chairman, that in the treaty of peace itself 
our commissioners, with a wise forethought and a display of 
statesmanship that is creditable indeed, have provided in the 
ninth article of that treaty that "The civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of the territory hereby ceded to 
the United States shall be determined by the Congress," thus leav- 
ing the whole question open to be determined by the legislation 
that shall be enacted by this or future Congresses. I have very 
pronounced convictions on this subject. I believe that territory 
acquired by the United States as Puerto Rico and the Philippine 
Islands have been acquired, under this treaty of peace between 
our Government and Spain, becomes the property of the United 
States Government and not a part of it, and that under the Con- 
stitution Congress can make such disposition of the islands as the 
members of the House and Senators may deem for the best 
interest of the people of this country and the inhabitants of the 
islands. 

I believe, further, that under the reservation in the treaty by 
which the civil rights and the political status of the native inhabit- 
ants are to be determined by Congress we can make such legislation 
regarding them as we shall see fit, consistent with the principles of 
our free Republic. I am aware, sir, that in announcing this position 
I take issue with the great mass of the gentlemen who are opposed 
to the present Administration and who are seeking to embarrass 
the Government. But, sir, in assuming the power of the Govern- 
ment both over these islands and the people as well, I am an- 
nouncing no new doctrine of constitutional law and am asserting 
no new principle of legislation. These principles which I main- 
tain have been asserted by abler men and maintained by more 

4083 



6 

cogent reasons than I can express. Chancellor Kent, in speaking 
on this very subject, said: 

It would seem from these various Congressional regulations of the Terri- 
tories belonging to the United States (Territorial regulation acts) that Con- 
gress has supreme power in the government of them, depending on the ex- 
ercise of their sound discretion. That discretion has hitherto been exercised 
in wisdom and good faith and with an anxious regard for the security of the 
rights and privileges of the inhabitants as defined and declared in the ordi- 
nance of July, 1787, and in the Constitution of the United States. "All admit," 
said Chief Justice Marshall, "the constitutionality of a Territorial govern- 
ment." But neither the District of Columbia nor a Territory is a State 
within the meaning of the Constitution or entitled to claim the privileges se- 
cured to the members of the Union. This has been so adjudged by the Su- 
preme Court. Nor will a writ of error or appeal lie from a Territorial court 
to the Supreme Court unless there be a special statute provision for that pur- 
pose. * * * If, therefore, the Government of the United States should 
carry into execution the project of colonizing the great valley of the Colum- 
bia or Oregon River, to the west of the Rocky Mountains, it would afford a 
subject of grave consideration what would be the future civil and political 
destiny of that country. It would be a long time before it would be populous 
enough to be created into one or more independent States; and in the mean- 
time, upon the doctrine taught by the acts of Congress, and even by the judi- 
cial decisions of the Supreme Court, the colonists would be in a state of the 
most complete subordination and as dependent upon the will of Congress as the 
people of this country would have been upon the King and Parliament of 
Great Britain if they could have sustained their claim to bind us in all cases 
whatsoever. — Commentaries, VoL I, 385. 

Judge Story, one of the ablest judges who ever sat upon the 
bench of the Supreme Court of the United States, and whose work 
on the Constitution is a recognized authority in this country and 
in England, said: 

The power of Congress over the public territory is clearly exclusive and 
universal; and their legislation is subject to no control, but is absolute and 
unlimited, unless so far as it is affected by stipulations in the cessions, ol- by 
the ordinance of 1787, under which any part of it has been settled.— Coni- 
mentaries, section 1328. 

I think, sir, that a careful analysis of the decisions of the Su- 
preme Court of the United States will support my contention that 
the ceded islands become the property of, and not an integral part 
of, the United States. In support of that position I desire to 
briefly call the attention of members of the House to what Mr. 
Justice Bradley said in the case of Mormon Church vs. United 
States (136 U. S., page 42): 

The power of Congress over the Territories of the United States is general 
and plenary, arising from and incidental to the right to acquire the territory 
itself and from the power given by the Constitution to make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the 
United States. It would be absurd to hold that the United States has power 
to acquire territory and no power to govern it when acquired. The power 
to acquire territory * * * is derived from the treaty-making power and 
the power to declare and carry on war. The incidents of these powers are 
Uiose of national sovereignty, and belong to all independent governments. 
The power to make acquisitions of territory, by treaty and by cession, is an 
Incident of national sovereignty. The Territory of Louisiana, when acquired 
from France, and the Territories west of the Rocky Mountains, when ac- 
quired from Mexico, became the absolute property and domain of the United 
States, subject to such conditions as the Government, in its diplomatic ne- 
gotiations, has seen fit to accept relating to the rights of the people then in- 
habiting those Territories. Having rightfully acquired said Territories, the 
United States Government was the only one which could impose laws upon 
them, and its sovereignty over them was complete. No State of the Union 
had any such right of sovereignty over them; no other country or govern- 
ment had any such right. These propositions ai-e so elementary and so 
necessarily follow from the condition of things arising upon the acquisition 
of new territory that they need no ai-gument"to supp<)rt them. 

Long prior to the date of this decision Mr. Justice Nelson, speak- 
ing for the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Brenner vs. Porter (9 How., 242), said: 

They (speaking of Territories) are not organized under the Constitution 
4083 



nor subject to its complex distribution of the powers of government, a8 
the organic law, but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative departs 
ment and subject to its supervision and control. 

As late as February, 1898, this question was before the circuit 
court of appeals of the United States for the ninth district, and 
the doctrine here announced by the Supreme Court in the deci- 
sions to which I have referred was reaffirmed by that court. Mr. 
Justice Morrow, who delivered the opinion of the court, evidently 
reexamined the whole question and carefully considered all the 
authorities cited on the subject by the lawyers on both sides of 
the case and came to the conclusion which I have maintained here 
to-day, and which has been so tersely and beautifully expressed 
by Mr. Justice Bradley in the decision to which I have adverted. 
Mr. Justice Morrow, in speaking for the court, used the following 
language: 

The answer to these and other like objections urged in the brief of counsel 
for defendant is found in the now well-established doctrine that the Terri- 
tories of the United States are entirely subject to the legislative authority of 
Congress. They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject to its 
complex distribution of the powers of government as the organic law, but 
are the creation exclusively of the legislative department and subject to 
its supervision and control. (Benneri;s. Porter, 9 How., 335, 243.) The United 
States, having rightfully acquired the territory, and being the only Govern- 
ment that can impose laws upon them, has the entire dominion and sover- 
eignty, national and municipal. Federal and State. (Insurance Co. vs. Canter, 
1 Pet., 511, 543; Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How., 164; National Bank vs. Yankton 
Co., 101 U. S., 139, 133; Murphy vs. Ramsey, 114 U. S., 15, 44, 5 Sup. Ct., 747; 
Late Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints vs. U. S., 
181, llSup. Ct.,949;Shively-i;s.Bowlby,152U.S.,l,48,14,Sup.Ct.,548.) * * * 
It may legislate in accordance with the special needs of each locality, and 
vary its regulations to meet the conditions and circumstances of the people. 
Whether the subject elsewhere would be a matter of local police regulation 
or within State control under some other power it is immaterial to consider. 
In a Territory all the functions of government are within the legislative 
jurisdiction of Congress, and may be exercised through a local government 
or directly by such legislation as we have now under consideration. (Endle- 
man vs. United States, 86 Fed. Rep., 456.) 

This, I think, is the latest expression on this subject by the 
courts. Gentlemen will see that it is in line with the spirit of 
the law as originally announced by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall 
and later by Mr. Justice Bradley, The members who are inter- 
ested in the study of this question and who take any pleasure in 
examining the authorities will find that not only is the opinion 
rendered by Mr. Justice Morrow correct, but will also find that 
Mr. Justice Bradley, in the opinion on this subject rendered by 
him, collects and reviews all the intervening decisions from 1 
Peters to the one which was rendered by him and which is pub- 
lished in 136 U. S. Reporter; so that I hazard nothing in saying 
that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the 
acquisition of territory where it is held as territory is the prop- 
erty of the United States. The Supreme Court in 18 Wallace, 
page 320, said: 

During the term of their pupilage as Territories they are mere depend- 
encies of the United States. All political authority exercised therein is 
derived from the General Government. 

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, my examination of this subject has 
caused me to express feelings of surprise that men question the 
constitutional status of these people under the treaty of peace, or 
question the status of the islands themselves, so far as the power 
and authority of the Congress of the United States oyer them is 
concerned. They may rely, however, upon the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of the United States relating to the right of trial 

4D83 



by jury in the Territories, tocitizepship, and the apportionment of 
taxes, etc. 

Mr. COCHRAN of Missouri. Will the gentleman allow me to 
ask him a question? 

Mr. HOPKINS. I will yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. COCHRAN of Missouri. I want to inquire of the gentle- 
man if he believes that had that part of the treaty for the pur- 
chase of Louisiana with France Iseen omitted, could Congress 
have passed a law interfering with the religious liberty of the 
people of the Louisiana purchase? 

Mr. HOPKINS. I want to say to the gentleman that if there 
had been no provision of that kind, the power of Congress would 
have been as unlimited as England in treating her colonies before 
the war of the Revolution, in the language of Judge Kent, and 
one as great as she exercises over her other provinces at the present 
time. 

Mr. COCHRAN of Missouri. One further question. 

Mr. HOPKINS. I can not yield further. 

Mr. COCHRAN of Missouri. It will be very brief. 

Mr. HOPKINS. Now, Mr. Chairman, when I was interrupted 
by the gentleman from Missouri I was attempting to show that 
under this constitutional provision the treaty of cession became 
the supreme law of the land, and enabled a person living within 
the limits of the Territory to invoke the powers of the Constitu- 
tion in his behalf precisely as he would if he had lived within the 
limits of a State. 

When we oome to understand this, we can readily see that the 
Supreme Court of the United States in passing upon the question 
as to the- right of trial by jury would use language that may be 
found in those decisions; that when they came to pass upon any of 
the questions relating to police powers they would use such lan- 
guage as they do without ever assuming the grave proposition 
that has been announced by the gentlemen on the other side of the 
Chamber in this debate. 

I am well aware that expressions can be found in a number of 
cases decided by that great tribunal which give color to the posi- 
tion assumed by gentlemen on the other side of the Chamber, who 
contend that the Constitution ex proprio vigore extends to the 
Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico. I have carefully studied 
each of these decisions, and I think when they are properly con- 
sidered they are in harmony with the position I assume and in 
harmony with the decisions of the courts which I have cited above 
in support of the doctrine that these newly acquired possessiong 
are the property of the United States and subject to such legisla- 
tion as Congress may see fit to enact respecting them. To prop- 
erly understand those decisions it may be necessary to call the 
attention of the members of the House to the diiierent treaties 
negotiated by this country with foreign countries in the acquisi- 
tion of territory. 

The first territory we acquired by treaty was during the year 1803, 
and is known as the Louisiana purchase. Article III of the treaty 
negotiated between this country and France reads as follows: 

The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated into the Union 
of the United States and admitted as soon as possible, according to the prin- 
ciples of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advan- 
tages, and immunities of the citizens of the United States; and in the mean- 
time they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their 
liberty, property, and the religion which they profess. 

4083 



When it is remembered that by Article VI of the Constitution 
•' all treaties made, or which shall be made, nnder the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land," it be- 
comes apparent at once that when the treaty from which I have 
just quoted was approved by the President and the Senate it be- 
came the supreme law of the United States and extended to the 
citizens living within the limits of the Louisiana purchase the 
rights ajid privileges of citizens of the States. It is also apparent 
that this vast territory was acquired by the Government of the 
United States for the purpose of being incorporated into the Union 
and giving the inhabitants thereof all the rights, privileges, and 
immunities of the people of the thirteen original States. 

Florida was ceded to the United States by Spain in 1819 under 
a treaty containing a similar provision to the one just quoted re- 
lating to the Louisiana territory. And the treaty by which New 
Mexico, California, Utah, and the other territory acquired from 
Mexico was ceded by that country to the United States contained 
a provision similar to that contained in the treaties concerning 
Florida and the province of Louisiana. You thus see that by the 
treaty, which under the Constitution becomes the supreme law of 
the land, certain rights under the Federal Constitution were con- 
ferred upon the inhabitants of the ceded territory. In none of 
these cases has the court said, independent of any treaty arrange- 
ment or act of Congress, that the Constitution ex proprio vigore 
extends to newly acquired possessions. When we acquired the 
Alaskan territory, a somewhat different agreement was entered into 
with Russia with reference to the territory itself and to the people 
living therein. That treaty, among other things, provided as fol- 
lows: 

But if they should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the 
exception of the uncivilized tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all 
rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and shall 
be protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. 
The uncivilized tribes shall be subject to such regulations as the United 
States may from time to time adopt in regard to the aboriginal tribes of that 
country. 

From this it is apparent that, aside from the acquisition of the 
Hawaiian Islands, all of the territory which we acquired prior to 
the cession of the Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico was under 
the treaty stipulations which extended to the inhabitants certain 
•f the rights, under the Constitution, of American citizens. 

Loughborough vs. Blake (5 Wheaton, 317) is the leading case 
relied upon by those who argue that the Constitution ex proprio 
vigore extends to all of our newly acquired possessions. That case 
was decided in 1820. The opinion was delivered by Chief Justice 
Marshall. It arose out of substantially the following facts: Jan- 
uary 9, 1815, Congress passed an act laying an annual direct tax 
of $6,000,000 upon the several States that formed the United States 
Republic, naming the States, eighteen in all. The amount was 
apportioned among them as provided by the Constitution. Feb- 
ruary, 27, 1815, Congress passed another act which in effect ex- 
tended the first act to the District of Columbia. A resident of the 
District of Columbia resisted payment on the ground that the act 
extending the original act to the District of Columbia was uncon- 
stitutional. His property was seized and he brought trespass 
against the officer making the seizure. 

The judgment of the court can be sustained fully on the grant 
of full legislative power found in Article I, section 8, subsection 

4083 



10 

17, of the Constitution. In delivering the opinion of the court, 
however. Chief Justice Marshall used language which implies that 
the " United States " means the States and Territories. This part 
of the opinion is conceded by all lawyers to be dictum, and that 
it is so regarded by the Supreme Court of the United States is ap- 
parent from the language of Mr. Justice Gray in the case of Gib- 
bons vs. The District of Columbia (116 U. S. Rep., 407). In speak- 
ing of the case of Loughborough vs. Blake he said: 

The point there decided was that an act of Congress laying a direct tax 
throughout the United States in proportion to the census directed to be taken 
by the Constitution might comprehend the District of Columbia, and the 
power of Congress, legislating as a local legislature for the District, to levy 
taxes for District purposes only, in like manner as the State legislature of a 
State may tax the people of a State for State purposes, was expressly admit- 
ted and has never since been doubted. 

Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion, did not make the dis- 
tinction which clearly exists that the term "United States" has a 
dual meaning. One, international, which means the empire of 
the United States, including the States that exist under the Con- 
stitution and all the territory as well. This term is conventional. 
It is a term that is used the same as we speak of the German Em- 
pire, and has no relation to the Constitution itself, which unites 
the forty-five States into one Federal Republic. In its constitu- 
tional meaning the term "United States" relates entirely to the 
States forming the Federal Republic, and it is in that sense in 
which it is used in the different provisions in the Constitution 
itself. As I have already shown, it was unnecessary for the Chief 
Justice to have used the language he did in upholding the con- 
stitutionality of the act in question, and it is apparent also that 
he did not give the significance to that language which has been 
given to it by our Democratic friends, from the fact that he was 
the judge who wrote the opinion in the Canter case, reported in 
1 Peters. The Canter case, while it does not in express terms 
overrule the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in Loughborough 
vs. Blake, uses language which is entirely inconsistent with the 
idea that a Territory, as such, is comprehended within the limits 
of the Constitution of the United States. 

Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall himself, in the case of Hepburn 
vs. Ellzey (2 Cranch, 445), fully determined that a Territory is not 
a State and not comprehended within the limits of the Constitu- 
tion._ In that case a resident of the District of Columbia brought 
suit in the United States court for the district of Virginia against 
a citizen of Virginia, The defendant contended that as a citizen 
of the District of Columbia he had no authority under the Consti- 
tution to bring such a suit. In determining that question Chief 
Justice Marshall said: 

On the part of the plaintififs it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct 
political society and is therefore a State according to the definitions of writers 
on general law. That is true. But as the act of Congress obviously uses the 
word "State" in reference to that term as used in the Constitution, it 
becomes necessary to inquire whether Colunibia is a State in the sense of 
that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the 
members of the American Confederacy only are the States contemplated in 
the Constitution. 

Again, in the case of New Orleans vs. Winter (1 Wheaton, 92), 
Chief Justice Marshall uses this language: 

It has been attempted to distinguish a Territory from the District of 
Columbia: but the court is of opinion that this distinction can not be main- 
tained. They may differ in many respects, but neither of them is a State in 
the sense in which that term is uf«d in the Constitution. 
4083 



11 

Scott vs. Sanford (19 Howard) is another case which is mncu 
relied upon by those who hold that our newly acquired cossessiona 
must be controlled, if at all, under the provisions of the Constitu- 
tion. A mere statement of the issue involved in that case, as it 
seems to me, will determine the fact that it can not be urged as 
an authority to guide us in the determination of our action in 
legislating for Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands. Scott was 
a slave, and his master took him from Missouri, where he was then 
a resident, into the State of Illinois and resided there for two years, 
and then into the Territory of Minnesota and resided there for two 
years. He then went back into the State of Missouri with his 
slave, and after he had become again domiciled in the State of Mis- 
souri Scott sued in the State courts for his freedom. 

The supreme court of Missouri held that it did not possess juris- 
diction beyond the territorial limits of the State and that it could 
not invoke the laws of Illinois or of the Territory of Minnesota to 
establish his freedom. The case was then taken into the Federal 
courts, and the only issue presented there and the only issue de- 
cided by the Supreme Court of the United States was as to whether 
that court had jurisdiction of the case. The decision of the court 
was that it did not possess jurisdiction. "Whatever was said out- 
side of that one issue was the dictum of the judge and not the de- 
cision of the court. We all know under what political excite- 
ment the opinions of the Chief Justice and his associates were 
delivered. They were simply the expression of political opinions 
and are not entitled to any weight as jxtdicial expressions. That 
1 am correct in this is apparent from the fact that it has never 
been relied upon by the courts and rarely has it been referred to 
in judicial opinions, 

American Publishing Company vs. Fisher (166 U. S., 464), the 
Slaughter House Cases, Springville vs. Thomas (166 U. S., 707), 
Thompson vs. Utah (170 U. S., 343), and many other cases that I 
might speak of have been referred to in this debate as supporting 
the doctrine that our newly acquired possessions have become an 
integral part of the United States and that the inhabitants 
thereon are entitled to the protection guaranteed to citizens under 
our Constitution. Those cases when properly analyzed do not 
support that contention. That issiie was not before the court in 
any of these cases. The language that has been relied upon is 
simply the dictum of the justice who prepared the decision for 
the court. Every person familiar with the decisions of our courts 
can readily understand that even the judge himself preparing 
the opinion would not wish to be bound to the exact and literal 
interpretation of every expression used in the way of illustrating 
the issue that is determined in the opinion. 

All of these cases arose under such different conditions from 
those that now confront us that it is preposterous to hold that all 
or any of them are authorities to guide us in legislating for Puerto 
Rico or the Philippine Islands. I venture the assertion that none 
of these decisions would have any weight with the Supreme 
Court, or at the most very little weight, when called upon to de- 
cide the constitutionality of the bill which we are now consider- 
ing. We are confronted in this legislation with the acquisition 
of territory under different terms from any previous acquisition 
in the history of the Republic. The location of the islands, cli- 
matic conditions, the inhabitants themselves and their known in- 
capacity at the present time for self-government will all have a 

4U83 



12 

powerful influence with the court iA determining the constitu- 
tionality of our action. 

It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opin- 
ion are to be taken in connection witti the case in which those expressions 
are used. If they go beyond the case they must be respected, but ought not 
to control the ;judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is pre- 
sented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question 
actually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its 
fullest extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are con- 
sidered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all 
other cases is seldom completely investigated. 

This is the language of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of 
Cohens vs. Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264). 

In re Ross (140 U. S. Rep., 453) the Supreme Court of the United 
States upheld a consular court established by Congress in Japan, 
consisting of a consul and four associates. A person charged with 
murder on an American vessel in Japanese waters was tried be- 
fore this consular court without a jury and without any of the 
safeguards provided by the Constitution. He was found guilty 
and sentenced to be executed. The sentence, however, was com- 
muted by the President to life imprisonment, and he was sent to 
the penitentiary at Albany, N. Y., to serve out his life sentence. 
While he was serving out his life sentence he sued out a writ of 
habeas corpus and raised the question as to the constitutionality 
of the court which had tried him, claiming that under the Con- 
stitution of the United States he had a right to trial by jury. The 
court held him to have been properly convicted, and upheld the 
act of Congress creating the court. This case is in harmony with 
those which 1 have already cited in support of the doctrine that 
Congress is supreme in the territories we have just acquired, and 
that the civil rights and the political status of the people of those 
islands can be fixed by Congress independent of any of the provi- 
sions or limitations in the Constitution. 

In the first case to which I have referred in my remarks here 
to-day— the Canter case, reported in 1 Peters— Daniel Webster 
was of counsel in the case. It was a case that arose out of the 
sale of cotton by order of a Territorial court in the Territory of 
Florida. Mr. Webster, in his argument, went into a full exposi- 
tion of the relations of the Territories to the Government of the 
United States. This, mark you, was in 1828, more than seventy 
years ago, and only a few years, comparatively speaking, after 
our Government had been organized under the Constitution. 
None of the decisions to which 1 have here referred had been ren- 
dered, but Mr. Webster, with that marvelous analytical ability 
which he possessed, with that knowledge of the Constitution and 
its proper construction which he always displayed when discuss- 
ing these questions, contended that the Constitution did not ex- 
tend over acquired territory; that territory itself was the prop- 
erty of the United States, and that Congress was the supreme 
power in legislating for such territory. 

The treaty of cession by which the United States became pos- 
sessed of the Territory of Florida was so worded that the Supreme 
Court was not retiuired to specifically and in exact language de- 
termine the proposition as Mr. Webster presented it to the court, 
but the spirit of that decision was along the line of the argument 
presented by Mr. Webster. Later decisions, as I have clearly 
shown here to-day, are all in harmony with the position that that 
great constitutional lawyer maintained. How comes it, then, that 
in the closing days of the nineteenth century, and after more than 
1083 



13 

a hundred years of constitutional government, we find men ap- 
parently learned in the law who take the opposite position, and 
who insist that the acquisition of the Philippine Islands under 
the treaty of peace with Spain maka? them an integral part of the 
United States and gives to the inhabitants there all of the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of American citizens? 

I think I can explain it, Mr. Chairman. These men are resur- 
recting a doctrine that ought to have gone down forever in the 
smoke and battle of the civil war. This principle, which has been 
resurrected for the purpose of creating trouble for this Adminis- 
tration and the Republican party, is simply a doctrine, clothed in 
a new garb, that was invented by John C. Calhoun, a brilliant 
intellect, but perverted by disappointed ambition into the nar- 
rowest of a State-rights advocate, and the inventor of the nullifi- 
cation doctrine of 1832 — the principle upon which the people of 
the South in 1861 sought to establish a Confederate government. 
It is one of the old cries for the extension of slavery, resurrected in 
this arena and at this time to frighten the people of this country 
in the great emergency which confronts us. 

In speaking as I do, Mr. Chairman, of Mr. Calhoun being the 
father of this doctrine, and that it was a dogma invented in sup- 
port of slavery, I am following the beaten path that was prepared 
for all who came after by the most distinguished Senator Missouri 
ever had in the Senate of the United States, namely, Thomas H. 
Benton. I crave the indulgence of the House while I read to my 
Democratic friends what he said. 1 read from the second volume 
of Mr. Benton's work, page 712, entitled "Thirty Years' View:" 

The resolutions of 1847 went no further than to attempt to deny the power 
of Congress to prohibit slavery in a Territory, and that was enough while 
Congress alone was the power to be guarded against, but it became insuf- 
ficient, and even a stumbling block, when New Mexico and California were 
acquired, and where no Congressional prohibition was necessary, because 
their soil was already free. Here the dogma of 1847 became an impediment 
to the territorial extension of slavery, for in denying power to legislate upon 
the subject the denial worked both ways, both against the admission and 
exclaision. „ ,„,- 

It was on seeing this consequence as resulting from the dogmas of 1847 
that Mr. Benton congratulated the country upon the approaching cessation 
of the slavery agitation; that the Wilraot proviso being rejected as unneces- 
sary, the question was at an end, as the friends of slavery extension could 
not ask Congress to pass a law to carry it into a Territory. The agitation 
seemed to be at an end and peace about to dawn upon the land. Delusive 
calculation! A new dogma was invented to fit the case, that of the transmi- 
gration of the Constitution (the slavery part of it) into the Territories, over- 
riding and overruling all the anti-slavery laws which it found there, and 
planting the institution thereunder its own wing, and maintaining it beyond 
the power of eradication either by Congress or the people of the Territory. 
Before this dogma was proclaimed efforts were made to get the Constitution 
extended to these Territories by act of Congress. E'ailing in these attempts, 
the difiaculty was leaped over by boldly assuming that the Constitution went 
of itself —that is to say, the slavery part of it. 

In this exigency Mr. Calhoun came out with his new and supreme dogma 
of the transmigratory function of the Constitution in the ipso facto and the 
instantaneous transportation of itself in its slavery attributes into all ac- 
quired Territories. This dogma was broached by its author in his speech 
upon the Oregon Territorial bill. History can not class higher than as a 
vagary of a diseased imagination this imputed self-acting and self-extension 
of the Constitution. The Constitution does nothing of itself, not even in the 
States for which it was made. Every part of it requires a law to put it mto 
operation. No part of it can reach a Territory unless imparted to it by act 
of Congress. Slavery, as a local institution, can only be established by local 
legislative authority. It can not transmigrate, can not carry along with it 
the law which protects it; and if it could, what law would it carry? ine 
code of the State from which the emigrant went? Then there would be as 
many slavery codes in the Territory as States furnishing emigrants, and 
these codes varying more or less, and some of them in the essential nature or 
the property— the slavein many States being only a chattel interest, governea 
4083 



14 

by laws applicable to chattels; in others, as in Louisiana and Kentucky, a real 
estate interest, governed by the laws which apply to lauded property. In a 
word, this dogma of the self -extension of the slavery part of the Constitution 
to a Territory is impractical and preposterous, and as novel as unfounded. 

I desire to emphasize the fact that in the whole history of our 
legislative government no man before Mr. Calhoun, in either 
branch of Congress, had ever asserted that doctrine. You will 
mark this, that prior to this time we had acquired the Louisiana 
territory, Florida, New Mexico, and California; in fact, we had 
extended our territory from the circumscribed limits of the thir- 
teen original States until we had reached from ocean to ocean; we 
had acquired an empire in territorial extent, and yet none of the 
leaders in either of the great political parties ever dreamed for a 
moment that the Constitution extended itself over it ex proprio 
vigore as is contended by our Democratic friends to-day. Fortu- 
natelj' for us in the elucidation of this question and the proper 
construction of the Constitution, Daniel Webster, the great ex- 
pounder of that instrument, was living and a member of the Sen- 
ate of the United States when Mr. Calhoun gave utterance to that 
doctrine which has been so strongly condemned by Mr. Benton. 

This was more than twenty years after Mr. Webster had pre- 
sented his views to the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Insurance Company rs. Canter (1 Peters). It was after 
his life had been enriched by his experience in the courts of his 
country, in the Senate, and as Secretary of State. Mr. Webster 
reflated Mr. Calhoun's position in language to which I desire to 
call the attention of my fellow-members. His exposition is so 
lucid and so profound that, in my judgment, it does not leave 
anything to be said by others. 

Let me say that in this general sense there is no such thing as extending 
the Constitution. The Constitution is extended over the United States and 
over nothing else. It can not be extended over anything except over the old 
States and the new States that shall come hereafter, when they do come in. 
There is a want of accuracy of ideas in this respect that is quite remarkable 
among eminent gentlemen, and especially professional and judicial gentle 
men. It seems to be taken for granted that the right of trial by jury, the 
habeas corpus, and every principle designed to protect personal liberty is 
extended by force of the Constitution itself over every new Territory. That 
proposition can not be maintained at all. How do you arrive at it by any 
reasoning or deduction? It can only be arrived at by the loosest of all possi- 
ble construction. It is said that this must be so, else the right of habeas cor- 
pus would be lost. Undoubtedly these rights must be conferred by law 
before they can be enjoyed in a Territory. 

Sir, if the hopes of some gentlemen were realized, and Cuba were to be- 
come a possession of the United States by cession, does anybody suppose that 
the habeas corpus and the trial by jury would be established in it by the 
mere act of cession? Why more than election laws and the political fran- 
chises or popular franchise? Sir, the whole authority of Congress on this 
subject is embraced in that very short provision that Congress shall have 
power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territories of 
the United States. The word is territories, for it is quire evident that the 
compromises of the Constitution looked to no new acquisitions to form new 
territories. But as they have been acquired from time to time, new terri- 
tories have been regarded as coming under that general provision for mak- 
ing rules for territories. We have never had a territory governed as the 
United States is governed. The legislature and the judiciary of Territories 
have always been established by a law of Congress. I do not say that while 
we sit here to make laws for these territories we are not bound by every one 
of those great principles which are intended as securities for public libertv. 

But they do not exist in Territories till introduced by the authority of 
Congress. These principles do not proprio vigore apply to one of the Ter- 
ritories of the United States, because that territory, while a territory, does 
not become a part and is no part of the United States. * * * One idea 
further upon this branch of the subject— the Constitution of the United 
States extending over the Territories and no other law existing there. Why, 
I beg to know how any government could proceed without any other author 
ity existing there than such as is created by the Constitution of the United 
4083 



15 

states? Does the Constitution of the United States settle titles to land! 
Does it regulate the rights of property? Does it fix the relations of parent 
and child, guardian and ward? The Constitution of the United States estab- 
lishes what the gentleman calls a confederation for certain great purposes, 
leaving all the great mass of laws which is to govern society to derive their 
existence from State enactments. That is the just view of the state of things 
Tjnder the Constitution. And a St&te or Territory that has no law but such 
as it derives from the Constitution of the United States must be entirelv 
without any State or Territorial government. * * * How did we gov- 
ern Louisiana before it was a State? Did the writ of habeas corpus 
exist in Louisiana during its territorial existence? Or the right to trial bv 
jury? * * * & J 

Well, I suppose the revenue laws are made in pursuance of its provisions; 
but, according to the gentleman's reasoning, the Constitution extends over 
the Territories as the supreme law, and no legislation on that subject is nec- 
essary. This would be tantamount to saying that the moment territory is 
attached to the United States all the laws of the United States as well as the 
Constitution of the United States become the governing will of men's con- 
duct and the rights of property, because they are declared to be the law of the 
land, the laws of Congress being the supreme law as well as the Constitution 
of the United States. Sir, this is a course of reasoning that can not be main- 
tained. The Crown of England often makes conquests of territory. Who- 
ever heard it contended that the Constitution of England, or the supreme 
power of Parliament, because it is the law of the land, extended over the 
territory thus acquired until made to do so by a special act of Parliament? 
The whole history of colonial conquest shows entirely the reverse. Until 
provision is made by act of Parliament for a civil government the territory 
IS held as a military acquisition. It is subject to the control of Parliament, 
and Parliament may make all laws that they may deem proper and neces- 
sary to be made for its government; but until such provision is made the 
territory is not under the dominion of English law. And it is exactly upon 
the same principle that territories coming to belong to the United States by 
acquisition or cession, as we have no jus coloniae, remain to be made subject 
to the operation of our supreme law by an enactment of Congress. 

I have referred to the manner in which this doctrine was first 
suggested in this country, and I have not only shown to you the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States bearing on 
this subject, but the views of the most distinguished expounder of 
our Constitution since the formation of the Federal Republic. Let 
me now call your attention to an able article on this subject from 
a historical standpoint written by historian McMaster. It is in 
the December number of the Forum, 1898. The article is well 
worthy the perusal of every student of American institutions and 
especially of every man desiring to obtain light on the subject 
now under consideration. It is written with all the facility of 
expression and profound research of that able historian. The 
couclusion he reaches is as follows: 

A review of the history of suffrage in the Territories thus makes it clear 
that foreign soil acquired by Congress is the property of and not part of the 
United States; that the Territories formed from it are without, and not un- 
der, the Constitution, and that in providing them with governments Con- 
gress is at liberty to establish just such kind as it pleases with little or no re- 
gard for the principles of self-government; that in the past it has set up what- 
ever sort was, in its opinion, best suited to meet the needs of the people, 
never stopping to ask how far the government so ci'eated derived its just 
powers from the consent of the governed, and that it is under no obligation 
to grant even a restricted suffrage to the inhabitants of any new soil we may 
acquire unless they are fit to use it projjerly. 

If my contention be true, Mr. Chairman, that these islands are 
only the property of the United States and that the inhabitants 
only acquire such rights as we may give them by legislation, it 
follows that we can have separate customs and internal-revenue 
laws for the islands, and navigation laws applicable to that country 
and distinct from our own, and, in fact, any legislation that will 
be for the well-being of the people of those islands and of the peo- 
ple of the States. I dissent in toto from the doctrine contended 
for by some, that our tariff laws and internal-revenue laws must 
be the same in these islands as they are in the United States. In 

4083 



16 

addition to what 1 have already said on this subject, I desire to 
call the attention of the House to the case of Fleming vs. Page. (9 
Howard, page 603.) Mr. Webster, who was of counsel in that 
case, in his argument said: 

That there was a difference between the Territories and the other parts of 
the United States. Judges were there appointed for terms of years, which 
the Constitution forbade as to other parts of the country. Hence the part 
of the Constitution which directs that duties must be equal in all the ports of 
the United States does not apply to Territories. 

Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion for the court 
in that case, said: 

This construction of the revenue laws has been uniformly given by the ad- 
ministrative department of the Government in every case that has come 
before it. And it has, indeed, been given in cases where there appears to 
have been stronger ground for regarding the place of shipment as a domestic 
port. For after Florida had been ceded to the United States and the forces 
of the United States had taken possession of Pensacola, it was decided by 
the Treasury Department that goods imported from Pensacola before an 
act of Congress was passed erecting it into a collection district and author- 
izing the appointment of a collector were liable to duty. That is, although 
Florida had, by cession, actually become a part of the United States, and was 
in our possession, yet under our revenue laws its ports must be regarded as 
foreign until they were established as domestic by act of Congress; and it 
appears that this decision was sanctioned by the Attorney-General of the 
United States, the law officer of the Government. 

And although not so directly applicable to the case before us, yet the deci- 
sions of the Treasury Department in relation to Amelia Island and certain 
ports of Louisiana, after that province had been ceded to the United States, 
were both made upon the same grounds. And in the latter case, after a 
custom-house had been established by law at New Orleans, the collector at 
that place was instructed to regard as foreign ports Baton Rouge and other 
settlements still in the possession of Spain, whether on the Mississippi, rber- 
yille, or the seacoast. The Department in no instance that we are aware of 
since the establishment of the Government has ever recognized a place in a 
newly acquired country as a domestic port from which the coasting trade 
might be carried on unless it had been previously made so by act of Con- 
gress. 

The principle thus adopted and acted upon by the executive department 
of the Government has been sanctioned by the decisions in this court and 
the circuit courts whenever the question came before them. We do not pro- 
pose to comment upon the different cases cited in the argument. It is suffi- 
cient to say that there is no discrepancy between them. And all of them, so 
far as they apply, maintain that under our revenue laws every port is re- 
garded as a foreign one unless the custom-house from which the vessel clears 
Is within a collection district established by act of Congress and the officers 
granting the clearance exercise their functions under the authority and con- 
trol of the laws of the United States. 

The enemies of national expansion have created in their imagi- 
nation a bogy man and with him are trying to frighten the 
laboring people of this country; they are assuming that the people 
of that distant and tropical climate will come to the cold regions 
of the North and drive out our laboring men with their cheap 
labor. A more groundless argument was never urged. It is almost 
fantastical when you consider it in its true light. There is not 
a Malay in this country to-day, and there will not be one an hun- 
dred years from now. Why? Because the climatic conditions are 
such that they will prefer to stay in their own country; they will 
secure a larger liberty under the administration we shall give 
them in their own islands than they have heretofore enjoyed, and 
will remain there instead of coming here to compete with Ameri- 
can labor. 

But, as I have stated, the treaty of peace under which we have 
acquired this territory leaves it with the Congress of the United 
States to provide against any of the contingencies that have been 
conjured up by the ingenuity of these Democratic speakers who 

4083 



17 

are seeking to throw a stumbling-block in the way of this Admin- 
istration in the discharge of the responsibilities which it has had 
thrust upon it by the fortunes of war. We can provide a system 
of government that will be adapted not only to the conditions of 
the islands from a climatic standpoint, but adapted to the state 
of political development of the people. What is important for us 
now is to demonstrate to them and to the world that America is 
united in her efforts to maintain peace and order in this territory. 
They in time will come to understand, as will all the world, that 
the form of government that we establish in these islands will 
start the people on an era of progress which has been unknown in 
their history. 

While this is bei'ag done it will be necessary for us, in the inter- 
est of humanity and the people themselves, to have a stable form 
of government there and an army suflficiently large to police the 
islands and drive out freebooters, whether under the leadership of 
Aguinaldo or any other military or political adventurer. I have 
grown tired, Mr. Chairman, in listening to the arguments of gen- 
tlemen on the other side of the Chamber when they talk about 
"imperialism," and that an increased Regular Army will stifle 
the liberty of our countrymen. But when I reflect on the history 
of my country and note the arguments of ill omen that have ever 
been addressed to the people when new territory has been ac- 
quired, I content myself in the belief that the notes of alarm 
sounded by the Democrats will fall on deaf ears, as they did on 
the deaf ears of the fathers of our country, who believed that the 
acquiring of new and additional territory, instead of weakening, 
would strengthen the Republic and aid it in its manifest destiny 
in the elevation of mankind. While these arguments of the pes- 
simists have ever found ready expression with a certain class of 
public men from the time of the acquisition of the Louisiana ter- 
ritory to that of the Hawaiian Islands, it certainly sounds strange 
coming from the lips of Democrats. 

The patron saint of the Democratic party is Thomas Jefferson, 
and yet, Mr. Chairman, he was the greatest territorial "expan- 
sionist " this Government has ever known. When the opportunity 
was presented to him by the first Bonaparte to acquire that mag- 
nificent empire known as the Louisiana Province, out of which 
have been carved some of the richest and most populous of our 
States, did he hesitate? Not a moment! He believed then, as we 
know now, that the acquisition of that territory would raise the 
American Republic from the condition of a fourth-rate power to 
that of a first-class power among the great nations of the world. 
In our youth and weakness, with an impoverished Treasury, with 
small means for raising revenue, he authorized his commissioners 
to pay the French Government the sum of $15,000,000 for this ter- 
ritory. Is there a man within the sound of my voice to-day who 
believes that Mr. Jefferson made a mistake in the acquisition of 
that territory? Is there a man to-day, in the light of our history, 
who believes that the principles of free government were weak- 
ened by the acquisition of this new territory, containing as it did 
a population who were strangers to our constitutional Govern- 
ment and enemies to our free institutions? And yet, Mr. Chair- 
man, some of the best minds of that day believed as fully as our 
Democratic friends profeds to believe to-day that the acquisition 
of the Louisiana Territory would work the destruction of the 
American Republic. 
4083-2 



18 

Let me read to you a few sentences from Fisher Ames, cue of 
the most distinguished Federalists of New England, one of the 
most accomplished men of his time, and one of the most brilliant 
and fascinating orators that ever addressed an audience: 

Now, by adding an unmeasured area beyond that [the Mississippi] river we 
rush like a comet into infinite space. In our wild career, we may jostle some 
other world out of its orbit, but we shall, in every event, quench the light of 
our own. * * * Having bought an empire, who is to be emperor? The 
sovereign people, and what people? All, or only the people of the dominant 
States, and the dominant demagogues in those States, who call themselves 
the people? As in old Rome, Marius, or Sylla, or Caesar, Pompey, Antony, 
or Lepidus will vote themselves provinces and triumphs. * * * But surely 
it exceeds all my credulity and candor on that head to suppose even they can 
contemplate a republican form as practicable, honest, or free, if applied when 
so manifestly inapplicable to the Government of one-third of God's earth. 

Mr. Josiah Quincy, of New England, at one time president of 
Harvard University, and at another time one of the most distin- 
guished men of this body, had this to say in opposition to the 
acquisition of the Louisiana Territorj^: 

Under the sanction of this rule of conduct, I am compelled to declare 
it as my deliberate opinion that if this bill passes the bonds of this Union 
are virtually dissolved; that the States which compose it are free from their 
moral obligations, and that, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the 
duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation, amicably if they can, 
violently if thej' must. * * * Do you suppo.se the people of the Northern 
and Atlantic States will or ought to look upon with patience and see Repre- 
sentatives and Senators from the Red River and Missouri pouring themselves 
upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard l,5lXt miles 
at least from their residence, and having a preponderancy in councils into 
which constitutionally they could never have been admitted? I have no 
hesitation on this point. They neither will see it nor ought to see it with 
content. * * * Grasp not too eagerly at your purpose. In your speed after 
uncontrolled sway, trample not down this Constitution. * * * j have no 
concealment of my opinion. The bill, if it passes, is a deathblow to the Con- 
stitution. It may afterwards linger, but, lingering, its fate will at no very 
distant period be consummated. 

This language of Fisher Ames and Josiah Quincy is as dole- 
ful in character as the prophecies which have been expressed by 
gentlemen on the other side of this Chamber in relation to the 
Philippine Islands. Mr. Chairman, it is my deliberate opinion 
that their statements and their prophecies are as ill-timed and 
their forebodings as little likely to prove true as were those of the 
opponents of the acquisition of the territory of Louisiana at the 
period of which I have just spoken. I believe that the United 
States Government is entering upon a new era of greatness, of 
expansion, and of glory. The Constitution possesses the elasticity 
of the fabled tent of the Arab. It was framed and adopted for 
the government of the thirteen original States, yet it has expanded 
over a continent. The 75,000,000 people who now live within its 
borders have the same liberty, the same sacred rights, and the 
treasured inheritance of free government that were guaranteed 
by the framers of the Constitution to the people of the thirteen 
original States. 

Under the interpretation that has been given to it by the great 
legislators of our country and the Supreme Court, the Constitution 
will enable us to acquire this territory in the Orient, and if we are 
as wise as those who have preceded us, will enable us to give 
those people rights of free citizens without infringing in the least 
upon the privilegesand immunities of our own people. I maintain, 
as I have already stated, that a government can be formed in the 
Philippine Islands that will be self-supporting through the cus- 
toms laws that we shall give them and the internal-revenue laws 

40« 



19 

that will follow; and instead of having a standing army of Amer- 
ican soldiers there, we can follow the wise example of Diaz in 
Mexico, who has taken the brigands from the mountains and 
made them soldier citizens, and has thereby secured the best police 
officers in the world. We can take native inhabitants for what- 
ever soldiers may be needed and officer them with men trained in 
our Regular Army and thus insure peace and tranquillity in the 
islands. By this method, Mr. Chairman, the United States Gov- 
ernment will place no new burdens upon our people. Our acqui- 
sition of those islands and our government of them will open a 
wider avenue for our trade. The surplus products of our farms 
and factories will find a market there and in the far east which 
would otherwise remain closed to us were the reactionary doc- 
trine advocated by Democratic members of this House and the 
Senate to be adopted and followed. 

Mr. Chairman, the President of the United States has stood 
forth through all of the great crises of the war and the problems 
that have followed it as one of the greatest statesmen of his time. 
He has shown qualities that have not only aroused the admiration 
of his political enemies, but that have even surprised his personal 
and political friends. From the first notes of war to this blessed 
hour every step that he has taken has been so well timed as not 
only to represent the prevailing sentiment of the Republic, but 
has been so wisely taken that history will vindicate his every 
action. [Applause on the Republican side.] Men may stand on 
this floor and denounce him, but when the grave of oblivion shall 
have closed over them his name will be recorded in the brightest 
pages in the history of our Republic. It falls to the lot of those 
who hold exalted positions to have detractors. He is only expe- 
riencing what was meted out to the sainted Lincoln during his 
Administration from the venomous lips of the political enemies of 
his party and policy. 

History almost repeats itself in many of the expressions that 
have been indulged in by gentlemen on tbis floor in their discussion 
of the questions now under consideration. For the benefit of those 
men who to-day are denouncing President McKinley and insisting 
that his attitude is indefensible, I wish to call their attention to 
some of the expressions that their Democratic predecessors used 
during the dark and stormy period of the civil war. Senator 
Polk, on the 10th of July, 1861, in the Senate of the United States, 
said, in discussing war measures: 

That war has been brought on by the President of the United States of his 
own motion and of his own wrong; and under what circumstances? 

Mr. Vallandigham, on the same day, in the House, said: 

I will not now venture to assert what may yot some day be made to ap- 
pear, that the subsequent acts of the Administration and its enormous and 
persistent infractions of the Constitution, its high-handed usurpations of 
power, formed any part of a deliberate conspiracy to overthrow the present 
form of Federal republican government and to establish a strong central- 
ized government in its stead. 

Senator Breckinridge, in the Senate, said: 

Then, Mr. President, the Executive of the United States has assumed 
legislative powers. The Executive of the United States has assumed ju- 
dicial powers. The executive power belongs to him by the Constitution. He 
has, therefore, concentrated in his own hands executive, legislative, and ju- 
dicial powers, which in every age of the world has been the very definition of 
despotism, and exercises them to-day. 

Mr. Burnett, in the House, on July 16, 1861, said: 
I say the Republican party will be held responsible for the unhappy con- 
dition of our country to-day. I say, in my place hero now, that tho only dia- 
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20 

anionists per se this country has ever been cursed with are the leaders of the 
Republican party. 

Again, on July 24, 1861, he said: 

You are writing, by indorsing and ratifying the illegal acts of this Admin- 
istration, one of the saddest, blackest pages in the history of this country. 

Mr. Voorhees, of Indiana, on February 20, 1862, said: 

A stupendous fraud has been practiced on the nation, and the Army of 
the United States has been obtained by fraud. 

On May 21, 1862, Mr. Voorhees said: 

Is this the age of republican .simplicity, or are we transported to the days 
of fraudulent usurpers, to the unhallowed scenes of the Roman Caesars? 

Senator David, on February 16, 1864, said: 

But in our free and limited government of a written constitution, Presi- 
dent Lincoln and his party, in utter disregard of its limitations and restric- 
tions, are making for him the same boundless and despotic powers * * * 
which the Plantagenets and Tudors and first Stuarts contended for in Eng- 
land. 

I read these extracts from speeches made by Democrats of a 
former generation to show to the Republicans of this House that • 
in pursuing the policy that has been outlined by our party and in 
sustaining the Administration we are subjecting ourselves to no 
fiercer criticisms than those hurled against the first President the 
Republican party gave to this country. We have nothing to fear 
from these base and groundless charges. Our duty, in my judg- 
ment, is clear, and that is, to fearlessly and conscientiously pro- 
vide for the great emergency that has been placed upon us by this 
war with Spain. [Applause on the Republican side. J Letusdis- 
charge our duty with a firmness and intrepidity that characterized 
the action of our fathers when the dark cloud of civil war over- 
hung our national horizon, and the people of to-day will as surely 
approve our conduct as did the people of a generation ago approve 
the conduct of President Lincoln and his advisers when they were 
exercising every power of the Constitution for the maintenance of 
the Union and the integrity of our Federal Republic. [Prolonged 
applause.] 

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